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In recent years leveraged buyouts [LBOs], in which a small group of in-
vestors purchase an ongoing business with almost entirely borrowed funds,
have become an increasingly popular form of investment." Banks, insurance
companies and Wall Street investment firms, among others, lend money to
"buy out" the previous owners and use the purchased company's assets and
cash flow as collateral.2 Consequently, the post-buyout company's capital is
used almost entirely as security for the purchase debt.3
LBOs have proved enormously profitable, in large part because of the
power of leverage and the federal income tax deduction on interest payments.
4
For example, former Treasury Secretary William Simon and his partners in
Wesray Corp. purchased Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc. in a leveraged buyout in
early 1982. In less than two years, Simon and another partner's initial
$330,000 investment had increased in value to over $66 million.5
This profitability associated with LBOs has resulted in many such trans-
actions in the 1980's.6 The economic conditions in this decade have been ideal
for LBOs: low interest rates and an expanding economy.1 But the very charac-
teristic that helps make LBOs so profitable, leverage, also makes them very
I. Dannen, LBOs: How Long Can This Go On?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov.
1986, at 151. In the United States, $9.2 billion in LBOs were transacted in 1983; $17.2
billion in 1984, $32 billion in 1985, and over $36 billion in 1986.
2. Id.
3. Comment, The Leveraged Buyout and Appraisal Rights: Balancing the Inter-
ests of Majority and Minority Shareholders, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123 (1985).
4. Dannen, supra note 1, at 151, 153. Mr. Dannen interviewed several LBO in-
vestors. No one interviewed reported an annualized return of less than 35 %. Indeed
most of the same investors reported returns of twice that amount.
5. Comment, supra note 3, at 123; Dannen, supra note 1, at 154.
6. Id. at 151.
7. Id.
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risky.8 Such risk prompts the concern that with the next economic downturn
will come the failure of many LBOs.9 As cash flow is reduced, a highly lever-
aged company could have difficulty meeting its debt payments.1 0 Cash flow is
especially important in LBOs financed with high-interest debt, commonly re-
ferred to as junk bonds. The interest rates paid on these bonds can approach
20% per year.' Less risky LBOs, however, are financed by banks at only a
few points over the prime interest rate.
12
If a post-LBO firm fails to meet its debt payments, it could fall prey to
bankruptcy.' 8 In addition to the normal ramifications associated with bank-
ruptcy, fraudulent conveyance laws can magnify the adverse consequences suf-
fered by certain secured creditors and selling shareholders of the pre-LBO
firm." Courts can use both section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code", and individ-
ual state fraudulent conveyance laws to set aside the secured status of lenders
and to recover any funds paid to the pre-LBO shareholders who sold their
stock in the transaction.' 8
This Comment will discuss the risks associated with fraudulent convey-
ances in a LBO bankruptcy from the perspective of both secured debtholders
and selling shareholders. It will suggest ways to minimize these risks by han-
dling the leveraged buyout properly from the outset.
8. Loomis, LBOs are Taking Their Lumps, FORTUNE, Dec. 7, 1987, at 63. This
is where the big risks of LBOs lie. When a company is primarily equity structured,
shareholders' dividends always can be forgone if cash flow is tight. Conversely when a
company is primarily debt structured, there is no option to withhold interest payments
to debt holders.
9. Id.; Comment, supra note 3, at 123.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Weiner & Parr, Private Thoughts, FORBES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 246. In the last
quarter of 1987 the prime lending rate was approximately 8.75 %. Id. (the prime lend-
ing rate is the rate charged to the lender's most credit worthy customers).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir.
1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
14. Id. at 1297.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
16. In Missouri, statutory law allows unsecured creditors to set aside a convey-
ance when that conveyance was made "with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud
creditors .... ." Mo. REV. STAT. § 428.020 (1986); see also Community Fed. Say. &
Loan v. Boyer, 710 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (case sets forth certain "badges
of fraud" constituting a presumption of fraud). In addition, many other states have
adopted either the provisions of the UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A.
(1918) [hereinafter UFCA] or the later UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A
U.L.A. (1985) [hereinafter UFTA] (Missouri has not adopted either the UFCA or the
UFTA). See Kirby, McGuinness & Kandel, Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in
Leveraged Buyout Lending, 43 Bus. LAW. 27 (1987); Murdoch, Sartin & Zadek,
Fraudulent Conveyances and Leveraged Buyouts, 43 Bus. LAW. 1 (1987).
[Vol. 53
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LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES As APPLIED To AN LBO
General Background
The history of fraudulent conveyance laws begins in 16th century Eng-
land.17 Parliament passed a statute to address the problem of debtors selling
their assets to friends and relatives for a small sum, with the understanding
that the debtor would get the property back once he took "sanctuary."' 8 Such
sanctuary was found in precincts where debtors could live outside the reach of
creditors' executions.' 9 Specifically, the statute made illegal and void any
transfer for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors.20
The basic idea underlying this statute has survived. Indeed, the Federal
Bankruptcy Code adopted similar language, 2' as did over thirty states in en-
acting either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act2' [hereinafter
"UFCA"] or the more recent Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act [hereinafter
"UFTA"] .23
The Federal Bankruptcy Act and state fraudulent conveyance laws may
be applied together to set aside fraudulent transactions. Specifically, section
548 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any convey-
ance by the debtor within one year before the bankruptcy filing if the convey-
ance was made "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor.24
In addition the trustee may set aside the conveyance if the debtor "received
less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obli-
gation"'2 and any one of the following occurred: (1) the debtor was or became
insolvent because of the transfer in question; (2) the debtor was left with an
unreasonably small amount of capital because of the transaction; or (3) the
debtor incurred or would incur liabilities beyond its ability to pay when the
17. Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38
VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985); see also In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.
1984) (case gives a good review of the history of fraudulent conveyances).
18. Baird & Jackson, supra note 17, at 829.
19. Id. (citing 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571)).
20. Id.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The statute provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on
or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred ...
22. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918).
23. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1984); Kirby, Mc-
Guinness & Kandel, supra note 16, at 27 n.2; Murdoch, Sartin & Zadek, supra note
16, at 1; (the UFCA was the model for § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Bank-
ruptcy Code was the model for the UFTA); see also Mo. REv. STAT. § 428.020 (1986).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
25. Id. § 548(a)(2).
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debts became due.2" Consequently, federal bankruptcy law provides for the
setting aside of fraudulent conveyances upon the finding of either intentional
fraud pursuant to section 548(a)(1) or constructive fraud pursuant to section
548(a)(2).27
Section 544 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act authorizes the trustee to avoid
any conveyances by the debtor that an unsecured creditor could avoid under
relevant state law.28 This is extremely important in that state fraudulent con-
veyance statutes usually incorporate longer statutes of limitations than the one
year provided for in section 548 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.29 Most
states allow a trustee to attack a fraudulent conveyance up to four to six years
from the time of the transaction. In Missouri, an unsecured creditor may
attack a fraudulent conveyance within five years of the transaction.3 1 More-
over, the statute of limitations does not start running until either the creditor
discovers the facts constituting fraud or ten years, whichever is less.3 2 Conse-
quently, trustees are more likely to bring actions to set aside fraudulent con-
veyances under state law because most LBOs are unlikely to go bankrupt
within a year of closing.33
Missouri, for example, allows an unsecured creditor to avoid any convey-
ance "made or contrived with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud credi-
tors." 4 Cases interpreting this statute have set forth certain "badges of fraud"
that form a presumption of intent to make a fraudulent conveyance.35 They
include: (1) inadequate consideration; (2) the transaction differed from usual
business transactions; (3) nearly all of the debtor's property was transferred;
(4) the transfer caused insolvency of the debtor; and (5) the failure to produce
evidence to rebut suspicious surrounding circumstances regarding the
26. Id.
27. See id. § 548 (a)(1)(2).
28. Id. § 544(b). This section also allows the trustee to avoid conveyances pursu-
ant to other applicable federal laws.
29. Id. § 548(a). The statute provides that: "the trustee may avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that
was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion. . . ." Id.
30. See Much & O'Dea, LBOs and the Risks of Fraudulent Conveyance, 9
NAT'L L.J. 36, 37 (Nov. 3, 1986) (e.g., California has a three year statute of limita-
tions; Texas, four years; and New York, three years).
31. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120(5) (1986): "Within five years: (5) An action for
relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have
accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the
facts constituting the fraud."
32. Id.
33. Kirby, McGuinness & Kandel, supra note 16, at 28 n.9.
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 428.020 (1986); see also Lindell Trust Co. v. Common-
wealth Land Title Ins. Co., 611 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
35. Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Boyer, 710 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo.
1986); Morris v. Holland, 529 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). None of these
"badges of fraud" alone establishes fraud. Rather, several must exist together to find a
presumption of fraud. Cohoon v. Cohoon, 627 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
[Vol. 53
4




These common law badges of fraud have found their way into various
statutory enactments. The UFCA and its progeny also treat certain transac-
tions with a per se fraudulent conveyance rule.3 7 Specifically, both treat any
transfer by an insolvent debtor for less than fair consideration as a fraudulent
conveyance.38
Consequently the presence of such a per se rule allows courts to set aside
some transfers without regard to whether the insolvent debtor had fraudulent
intent. 39 Indeed, the UFCA drafters intended certain transfers, such as gifts to
relatives, to be set aside regardless of intent because such transactions were
"inherently objectionable." 40
Since fraudulent conveyance law in some situations dispenses with the
requisite finding of intent to defraud creditors, the pivotal question is "what
are its limits?"' 4' As Professors Baird and Jackson have noted, this is becoming
an increasingly important issue in that courts now are applying fraudulent
conveyance laws to corporate debtors; whereas, most case law in the area in-
volves individual debtors.42 Indeed, Baird and Jackson point out that most
challenged transactions under fraudulent conveyance laws "have been between
relatives, friends, or other insiders. 43
Accordingly, it seems difficult to reconcile the original goal of fraudulent
conveyance law - to prevent fraud or gratuitous transfers - with seemingly
arms-length transactions like LBOs.44 To fully understand this anomaly, it is
helpful to understand how a typical LBO is transacted.
Although LBOs can be structured several ways, this comment will ad-
dress the stock acquisition form of LBO with respect to fraudulent
36. See Allison v. Mildred, 307 S.W.2d 447, 454 (Mo. 1957); Harrison v. Harri-
son, 339 S.W.2d 509, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
37. Baird & Jackson, supra note 17, at 830-31.
38. Id.; UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918) (a
transfer made by an insolvent debtor for less than fair consideration is deemed to be a
fraudulent conveyance); 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (allows
the bankruptcy trustee to set aside a transfer as a fraudulent conveyance of the debtor
if the debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value" and if, inter alia, the
debtor was insolvent).
39. Baird & Jackson, supra note 17, at 831.
40. Id. at 831-32 (citing Comment, Guarantees and Section 548 (a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1985)). Professors Baird and Jackson note
that the UFCA drafters thought that "an insolvent debtor who gives 1000 dollars to his
mother makes a fraudulent conveyance, even if he has made a similar gift each year in
the past and is not motivated in the slightest by a desire to thwart creditors." Id.
41. Id. at 832.
42. Id.
43. Id. The authors found that "if a case did not concern a transfer in which the
possibility of a deliberate effort to hinder, delay, or defraud was high, typically it con-
cerned a gratuitous transfer that never could have redounded to the benefit of the cred-
itors and that creditors would have prohibited given the opportunity." Id.
44. Id. at 833.
1988]
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conveyances. 45 In the garden-variety stock acquisition LBO, the acquiring par-
ties (LBO investors) form a holding company to enter an agreement with the
selling shareholders of the corporation to be purchased (the target company)."
The holding company obtains an unsecured loan from a lender which is used
to purchase the target company stock from the selling shareholders. 47 The tar-
get then takes out a loan secured by its assets. The proceeds of the target loan
are transferred to the holding company, which uses the funds to repay the
lender of the unsecured first loan. 8
Several of these transactions may be subject to fraudulent conveyance
law. Indeed, case law illustrates the willingness of courts to find potentially
fraudulent conveyances in: (1) the purchase of the target company stock from
the selling shareholders; (2) the security interest given by the target on its
assets to the lender; and (3) the transfer from the target's loan to the holding
company. 1
Viewing these three transactions together, one can argue that a LBO will
be a fraudulent conveyance.50 The investors have a potentially highly profita-
ble investment with little risk to their own money.51 The old shareholders get
bought out with cash, while the general creditors are left with less protection
in that the debt is increased with no corresponding increase in assets. 2 This
supports the view that an LBO "hinders" the creditors.5 3 Of course, to estab-
lish a fraudulent conveyance, the creditor would have to prove intent, which
could be very difficult.5 '
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
The trustee or general creditors have a better method to assert a fraudu-
lent conveyance. As noted earlier, the constructive fraud provisions of the
UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act provide that any transfer by an insolvent
debtor without receiving fair consideration can be deemed a fraudulent
45. For a good discussion of the ways in which a LBO can be structured, see
Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73 (1985).
46. Murdoch, Sartin, & Zadek, supra note 16, at 3. The formation of a holding
company protects the investors from personal liability for the loan. Carlson, supra note
45, at 81 n.24.
47. Id.; see Murdoch, Sartin & Zadek, supra note 16, at 3.
48. Id. This is typically referred to as "upstreaming."
49. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir.
1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
50. See Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
51. Baird & Jackson, supra note 17, at 851; see also Tabor Court, 803 F.2d at
1288.
52. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 17, at 851.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); UNIF. FRAUD-
ULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918).
[Vol. 53
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conveyance.55 Thus, the security interest granted in the target's assets to se-
cure funds which the target will then transfer to the holding company can be
set aside as fraudulent because the debtor receives nothing for granting a se-
curity interest for the funds that it is to transfer.
In addition to setting aside the security interest, the trustee may bring
back into the debtor's estate the money paid to selling shareholders, absent the
applicability of section 548(c) which provides:
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation is voidable under this section
is voidable under section 544, 545 or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee
of such a transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a
lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation
incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such.., transferee or obligee
gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer obligation.5
Thus, a selling shareholder who has knowledge that the LBO possibly is void
under fraudulent conveyance laws would not be a "good faith" transferee of
funds secured by the target's assets. 57
Other decisions under the UFCA have even more disturbing implications.
Specifically, In re Anderson Industries, Inc,58 ignored the UFCA59 good faith
requirement recognized by other courts.60 In addition, by application of the
constructive fraudulent conveyance provisions, the court held it possible to re-
cover funds paid to any shareholders (no matter how large the number) who
55. Baird & Jackson, supra note 17, at 851. A similar method of finding con-
structive fraud is available in those states not having adopted the UFCA, through the
presumption created by "badges of fraud." See cases cited supra note 35.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Note that the UFCA doesn't
have an equivalent section to § 548(c), but the UFCA does require "good faith." UNIF.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. 448 (1918). However, courts have
held that good faith is not limited to fair consideration and thus the result should be
the same as if § 548(c) was included in UFCA. See Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397,
189 A.2d 15 (1963). Indeed, courts have been willing to construe the multiple transac-
tions as one in order to find a transfer of funds by the debtor corporation directly to the
selling shareholders, thus ignoring the actual form of the transaction in which the sell-
ing shareholders were actually bought out by the holding company. See United States
v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Penn. 1983).
57. See Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 575. This is basically a tracing rule which
follows the fraudulently conveyed funds until they get to a good faith transferee; cf.
World Broadcasting Sys. v. Bass, 160 Tex. 261, 328 S.W.2d 863 (1959) (court did not
even bother tracing the fraudulently conveyed funds through to selling shareholder;
rather the court just held the selling shareholders personally liable for outstanding
debts of the corporate debtor to the extent that the assets were "appropriated" by the
selling shareholders); see also Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 77
Bankr. 754 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (court held that shareholders were acting in good
faith because they believed that buyer of their company in an LBO had sufficient finan-
cial backing to run the company).
58. 55 Bankr. 922 (Banker. W.D. Mich. 1985); see also McCluer v. White, 338
Mo. 1017, 93 S.W.2d 696 (1936); May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 4 S.W.2d 769 (1928).
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sold their stock in the LBO of a large publicly held corporation if the corpora-
tion became insolvent.61 This holding is incorrect in that it ignores the explicit
good faith requirement in section 9 of the UFCA.62 Most shareholders selling
their stock in an LBO of a large publicly held corporation would lack the
knowledge necessary to set aside the conveyance. The only likely shareholders
that would not have good faith would be large shareholders or other insider
shareholders.
THE FAIR CONSIDERATION REQUIREMENT
Herein lies a potential trap for both the creditors who lend the funds to
transact the LBO and for the shareholders who sell their stock in the target:
the threshold question of whether "fair consideration" was given to the target
corporation for its conveyance of a security interest in all its assets. 3 The
UFCA provides that
[flair consideration is given for property, or obligation:
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent
therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is
satisfied, or
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure a
present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as
compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained. 64
There are a number of factors that go into determining whether "good faith"
under the UFCA existed. Specifically: "1) honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; 2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others;
and 3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will
hinder, delay, or defraud others."6 5 In deciding whether "fair consideration"
61. In re Anderson, 55 Bankr. at 926. The court did, however, acknowledge the
complexity involved in such an undertaking. Id.
62. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 577 (1918), provides:
(1) Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such
creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a
purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of
the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately from such a purchaser,
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent neces-
sary to satisfy his claim, or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property
conveyed.
(2) A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than a
fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation, may retain the property or
obligation as security for repayment.
63. Id; see also United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
64. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. (1918); see Running
v. Widdes, 52 Wis. 2d 254, 190 N.W.2d 169 (1971) (definition of fair consideration
should be construed in favor of creditors).
65. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1296 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987) (citing Sparkman & McClean Co. v.
[Vol. 53
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was given, courts look at the particular circumstances surrounding the ques-
tionable transfer.6 6 A Pennsylvania court held in a LBO bankruptcy that the
initial question in determining whether there was "fair consideration" was
whether the lender lent the proceeds in good faith.17 The next inquiry is
"whether the obligation received [by the lender] was the fair equivalent of the
loan[] to the borrowing compan[y]." 68
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code requires that the debtor receive "reasona-
bly equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation." 9 Moreover,
the concept of "reasonable equivalence" was derived from the UFCA. Thus,
precedents from the UFCA are highly persuasive under the Bankruptcy
Code.70
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 7 1 provided a particularly
helpful explanation of the bases which underlie the "reasonably equivalent"
requirement. The court stated:
if the debtor receives property or discharges or secures an antecedent debt
that is substantially equivalent in value to the property given or obligation
incurred by him in exchange, then the transaction has not significantly af-
fected his estate and his creditors have no cause to complain. By the same
token, however, if the benefit of the transaction to the debtor does not sub-
stantially offset its cost to him, then his creditors have suffered, and in the
language of [§ 548(a)(2)(A)], the transaction was not supported by "fair"
consideration. 7
2
Significantly, Rubin involved a trustee's attempt to recover the value of
collateral the bankrupt corporation gave a bank to guarantee loans made to
the bankrupt's affiliate companies. 73 The court held that in such a three-party
transaction, a corporation's guarantee to benefit a corporate affiliate does not
Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585 (1971)); see also Chorost v. Grand Rapids
Factory Showrooms, 77 F. Supp. 276, 281 (D.N.J. 1948), affd, 172 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.
1949) (good faith requires "lack of knowledge of such facts as would put reasonably
prudent person on inquiry" of the possibility of fraudulent conveyance laws avoiding
the transaction.).
66. Halsey v. Winant, 258 N.Y. 512, 180 N.E. 253 (1932).
67. United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574 (M.D. Penn.
1983).
68. Id.; see also Neal v. Clark, 75 Ariz. 91, 251 P.2d 903 (1953); First Nat'l
Bank v. Hoffines, 429 Pa. 109, 239 A.2d 458 (1968).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). "Value" is defined as
"property, or satisfaction of securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but
does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a rela-
tive of the debtor." Id. § 548(d)(2)(A); see also Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Roco Corp., 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st
Cir. 1982).
70. D. COWANS, COWANs BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.9, at 185
(1986).
71. 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
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result in fair consideration to such corporation when it received no benefit
from having done so.14
Accordingly, when the target firm in an LBO conveys a security interest
in its assets for a loan whose proceed are to be transferred to a holding com-
pany (and for all intents and purposes to the selling shareholders), the costs to
the target are not "substantially offset" by the benefits of the transaction.75
Notwithstanding this, other courts have adopted a more liberal interpretation
of "fair consideration" in light of modern corporate practices. For instance, in
Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc.,76 the court held that when a "debtor and the
third party are so related or situated that they share an 'identity of interests,'
because what benefits one, will in such case, benefit the other to some de-
gree."' 77 Nevertheless, the same opinion stated that:
The ultimate question then becomes one of determining the value of this vica-
rious benefit and testing it by the measure of "reasonably equivalent" for the
property transferred by the insolvent debtor. When the consideration for a
transfer passes to the parent corporation of a debtor/subsidiary making the
transfer ... the benefit to the debtor may be presumed to be nominal, in the
absence of proof of a specific benefit to it.78
Applying this to the context of an LBO (which of course is a three-party
transaction)79 indicates that a court could find a lack of fair consideration
when the target grants a security interest to the lender. In a technical sense,
the target receives no benefit when it grants the security interest for proceeds
which are upstreamed to the holding company.8"
74. Id. The court did point out that the benefit received by the guaranteeing
corporation need not be direct. "If the consideration given to the third party 'ultimately
landed in the debtor's hands' or otherwise conferred an economic benefit upon the
debtor in an amount that approximately benefits the value of the thing given up, then
the fair consideration requirement has been met." Id. at 991, 992 (citing Klein v.
Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)); see Williams v. Twin City Co., 251 F.2d
678 (9th Cir. 1958); McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1968)); see
also In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc., 28 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re
Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc., 23 Bankr. 28 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
75. See Rubin, 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Tabor Court, 803 F.2d
1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987). In Missouri, "[iut is well
settled that a conveyance by a debtor of all or nearly all of his property gives rise to an
inference of fraudulent intent." Lindell Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.
Co., 611 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Harrison v. Harrison, 339
S.W.2d 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)). But see McCluer v. White, 338 Mo. 1017, 1024, 93
S.W.2d 696, 700 (1936). "If at the time of making the conveyance the grantor retained
ample means to pay his debts ... [then] the conveyance is valid". Id.
76. 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.C.N.J. 1984)
77. Id. at 1378 (quoting In re Royal Crown Bottlers Inc., 23 Bankr. 28 (N.D.
Ala. 1982)).
78. Id.
79. The three parties: (1) the target company; (2) the LBO investors; and (3) the
lender.
80. Note that the upstreamed proceeds to the holding company are used to pay
off the unsecured loan which was used to cash out the selling shareholders.
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Using "identity of interests" reasoning, the holding company and target
are closely related. The holding company merely serves as a vehicle to facili-
tate the LBO of the target. The target "benefits" in that the "new" target is a
privately-held corporation not subject to expensive SEC reporting require-
ments.8' In addition, most post-LBO companies strive to increase profits by
cutting costs, closing unprofitable operations and eliminating expensive corpo-
rate perks for management."2 Thus in an LBO transaction, one can argue that
the holding company provides adequate consideration by trying to save a fail-
ing company or increasing profits of a stable company. Notwithstanding this
logic, Credit Managers Association v. The Federal Co.83 stated that, because
of the very nature of an LBO, the target probably never receives fair consider-
ation (under the confines of the Bankruptcy Code and the UFCA) for the
obligation it assumes.8 4
Nevertheless, a later decision that relied heavily on Credit Managers
lends support to shareholders who ultimately received the proceeds that were
part of an alleged fraudulent conveyance. In Kupetz v. Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust Co., 5 the bankruptcy court held that just because the
target company did not receive fair consideration when its assets were pledged
for the loan that was subsequently upstreamed to the holding company to pay
off the unsecured debt does not make the payment to the selling shareholders
fraudulent.8 8 Indeed, the court reasoned that the shareholders' selling their
stock to the holding company was a "fair transaction" made for fair considera-
tion. 17 Accordingly, the court held that the shareholders should not be pun-
ished for the company's later transactions to which they were not parties.88
81. See Anders, Another Round: Many Firms Go Public Within a Few Years of
Leveraged Buyout, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 6.; Baird & Jackson, supra note
17, at 853.
82. Anders, supra note 81, at 1, col. 6.
83. 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
84. Id. at 182. The court held as a matter of law that management services pro-
vided by an affiliate to the debtor company did not constitute fair consideration for the
obligation the debtor received. Id. (citing United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F.
Supp. at 576); see also Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 77 Bankr.
754 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
85. 77 Bankr. 754 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 761. In fact, the LBO investor testified that he thought he was getting
a good deal. Id. at 764.
88. Id. It is possible this case will be limited to its facts. Evidence introduced at
trial showed that the selling shareholders were unaware that the target was going to
convey a security interest in all its assets in order to obtain financing which was then
upstreamed to the holding company in order to retire the unsecured debt taken to
buyout the selling shareholders. Id. at 758. In contrast, in most LBOs, the selling
shareholders are probably well aware of the leveraged nature of the transaction.
1988]
11
Sloan: Sloan: Leveraged Buyouts
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
FINANCIAL CONDITION
If the court decides that less than reasonably equivalent value was given99
in a leveraged buyout transaction, its next inquiry under the Bankruptcy Code
is determining whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent as a re-
sult of the transfer,90 was left with unreasonably small capital after the trans-
fer,91 or was left with debts that the debtor would be unable to pay.92
Likewise, the UFCA provides similar bases for finding constructive fraud
once the court finds that the debtor made a conveyance without receiving fair
consideration. 3 UFCA section 4 provides one test of financial condition:
"[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or
will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard
to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred
without fair consideration. 9 4
Further, the UFCA provides that a debtor is insolvent "when the present
fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to
pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and
matured."9 5 Unfortunately, this test still does not necessarily make it clear just
when a debtor is rendered insolvent. For example, in United States v.
Gleneagles Investment Co.98 (a LBO bankruptcy case) the court held that
"present, fair, salable value" as used in the Pennsylvania UFCA definition of
insolvency means "the value which can be obtained if the assets are liquidated
with reasonable promptness in an arms-length transaction in an existing and
not theoretical market. ' '97 Moreover, the Gleneagles court stated that:
[i]f a debtor has a deficit net worth, then the present salable value of his
assets must be less than the amount required to pay the liability on his debts
as they mature. A debtor may have substantial paper net worth including
assets which have a small salable value, but which if held to a subsequent
date could have a much higher salable value. Nevertheless, if the present sala-
ble value of his assets are [sic] less than the amount required to pay existing
debts as they mature, the debtor is insolvent. 98
89. For this Comment's purposes, "fair consideration" as used in the UFCA will
be the functional equivalent of "less than reasonably equivalent value" as used in the
Bankruptcy Code.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii).
93. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-6, 7A U.L.A. (1918).
94. Id. § 4; see In re Knox Kreations, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 567, 571 (E.D. Tenn.
1979); Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 573.
95. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985).
96. 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Penn. 1983).
97. Id. at 578; see also Hyde Prop. v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 307 (6th Cir.
1974).
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This rigid approach to insolvency necessarily results in many LBO target
companies being considered insolvent because the post-transaction company is
structured primarily with debt.9 9 As discussed above, LBO investors plan to
increase the profitability of their investment by increasing the value of the
company.10 0
Regardless of Gleneagles, other courts have taken a more realistic ap-
proach to the issue of insolvency. 01 For example, in Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV,
Inc.102 the court held that just because the debtor's liabilities exceed assets it
does not necessarily mean that the corporation is insolvent.'0 3 If the debtor
corporation is "actively pursuing its regular business with a reasonable expec-
tation that business conditions will improve and that it will be re-established
on a sound financial basis" then it is quite possible that the debtor corporation
was solvent at the time of the alleged fraudulent transaction and remained so
thereafter.104
Missouri courts apply similar reasoning. Essentially, if at the time of the
conveyance the debtor retained "ample means" to pay his debts as they come
due, then the debtor is not insolvent for fraudulent conveyance purposes. 0 5
The holding in Credit Managers Association v. The Federal Co.,'06 illus-
trates another test of financial condition available to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance: the transfer is considered fraudulent if it left the debtor with "un-
reasonably small capital" to continue business.' Specifically, the relevant
provision provides that:
[elvery conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making
it engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for which the
property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably
small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become
creditors during the continuance of such business or transaction without re-
gard to his actual intent.10 8
99. See Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 178 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
100. See Anders, supra note 81, at 1, col. 6.
101. See, e.g., Freehling v. Michigan Repacking & Produce Co., 426 F.2d 989,
990 (5th Cir. 1970); Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1375-76
(D.N.J. 1984); Hersh v. Levinson Bros., 117 N.J. Eq. 131, 136, 171 A. 736, 739
(1934).
102. 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.J. 1984).
103. Id. at 1376.
104. Id. Creditor sought to have a security agreement given on the assets of a
subsidiary of the debtor set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 1371.
105. See McCluer v. White, 338 Mo. 1017, 1024; 93 S.W.2d 696, 700 (1936);
see also May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 677, 4 S.W.2d 769, 771 (1928). Note that this
reasoning is the functional equivalent of the second and third tests of financial condi-
tion as discussed infra text accompanying note 13 1.
106. 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
107. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 504 (1918); 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
108. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 504 (1918).
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Thus, if the holding company did not give fair consideration, and the sur-
rounding facts indicate the post-LBO target was left insufficiently capitalized,
then courts under this test consider the LBO transaction fraudulent.10 9 Al-
though several factors enter into the question, Credit Managers deemed the
projected cash flows at the time of the LBO transaction as most important.111
The court reasoned that the cash flow projections show the target company's
ability after the LBO to meet its obligations as they would become due."'
Moreover, the issue of proper cash flow analysis turns not on whether the anal-
ysis turned out to be correct; rather, it depends on whether the projection was
"reasonable and prudent at the time it was made. 1 1 2
As Credit Managers illustrates, the financial condition test of adequate
capitalization11 3 is similar to the requirement that the parties believe that the
transaction will not cause the debtor to incur "debts that would be beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured."" 4 Indeed, Credit Managers
states that the determination of whether the post-LBO company will be ade-
quately capitalized depends on whether the projections made at the time of the
LBO indicated that the business could continue to operate and to meet its debt
servicing requirements." 5 But, the adequate capitalization requirement "does
not require that [debtor] companies be sufficiently capitalized to withstand
any and all setbacks to their business." 6 It only requires that capitalization
not be "unreasonably small.""117
As a result, if there was a reasonable expectation at the time of the LBO
transaction that the target would be able to meet its operating expenses, it
would be adequately capitalized. Nevertheless, if the LBO company subse-
quently becomes bankrupt, courts can make a hindsight determination based
solely on insolvency." 8 If the court follows the Gleneagles definition of insol-
vency, which is based on net worth calculated with liquidation or "fire-sale"
asset values, then the LBO runs a much greater chance of being found to have
occured while the target was insolvent or to have caused the target's insol-
vency. 1 9 But this is an illogical way to value assets. At the time of the LBO,
109. Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. at 182.
110. Id. at 183.
111. Id. The cash flow analysis in Credit Managers showed that at the time the
LBO was transacted, the target company was expected to "have sufficient funds to
carry on its operations." Id.
112. Id. at 184. This determination is based on projected sales, gross profit mar-
gins and inventory turnover, accounts receivable collection periods, and certain balance
sheet financial ratios. Id. at 184, 188. In this case, the court held the projections were
reasonable at the time made. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, events such as
a strike by the target's employees helped to make the cash projections incorrect.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. IV. 1986).
114. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii).
115. Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. at 187.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(A)(2)(B)(i) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
119. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir.
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the parties based the stock price on the fair market value of the company as
normally used in the business context.2 0 Consequently, it seems unfair to later
judge the solvency of the target by the harsher test of rapid sale market
value.' 21
The preeminent case regarding LBO transactions and fraudulent convey-
ances is United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp. 22 The facts and circum-
stances of the case are exceedingly complicated, involving dozens of parties
and separate cases which were consolidated on appeal. 23 The LBO in the
Gleneagles decisions and reviewed in Tabor was found to be fraudulent on
several bases. First, the security interest granted in the target was invalid
under the intentional fraud sections of the UFCA.2 4 Moreover, the Tabor
court invalidated the mortgages under the UFCA constructive fraud
provisions.
25
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
120. Black's Law Dictionary defines "fair market value" as:
The amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. By fair market value
is meant the price in cash, or its equivalent, the property would have brought
at the time of taking, considering its highest and most profitable use, if then
offered for sale in the open market, in competition with similar properties at
or near the location of the property taken, with a reasonable time allowed to
find a purchaser.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added); see also Hyde Prop.
v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974). "Essentially the statutory provision [the
UFCA] anticipates a voluntary, open market sale of all of an individual's assets." Id.
at 307.
121. As National Commercial Finance Ass'n, Inc. argued in its amicus curiae
brief in Tabor, the district court in Gleneagles incorrectly interpreted the word "pre-
sent" as used in UFCA § 2. Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 578. "Present fair salable
value" is interpreted to mean the value that could be received if the "assets are liqui-
dated with reasonable promptness in an arms-length transaction in an existing and not
theoretical market." Id. In contrast, "[p]roper application ... requires the valuation of
an asset at its present value, provided it can be liquidated within a reasonably immedi-
ate period of time - not its value if liquidated immediately." Tabor, 803 F.2d at 1303
(quoting from appellant's brief at 37); see also In re Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc.,
299 F. Supp. 545, 548 (D. Minn. 1969); Tumarkin v. Gallay, 127 F. Supp. 94, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
122. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987). This
was the first case involving "significant application of the UFCA to leveraged buyout
financing." Id. at 1291.
123. Id. The district court made 481 findings of facts and issued three separate
published opinions. For an in-depth analysis of the Gleneagles decisions, see Murdoch,
Sartin & Zadek, supra note 16.
124. Tabor, 803 F.2d at 1304, 1305; see UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
§ 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918), which provides that "[e]very conveyance made and every
obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to
hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both
present and future creditors."
125. 803 F.2d at 1296, 1297; see also UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
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As Professor Carlson pointed out, the lender involved in Gleneagles was
not exactly deserving of sympathy. 26 Indeed, evidence surrounding the loan to
the target company indicated that the lender did not expect the target com-
pany to survive. 127 Moreover, the selling shareholders settled out of court, dis-
gorging almost all the proceeds they received from the transaction.128 The
troubling aspect of Gleneagles is not the result, but the way in which the court
arrived at its decision. By applying constructive fraudulent conveyance provi-
sions, the court established a dangerous precedent that could punish above-
board lenders and selling shareholders should the company subsequently fail.
As a result of Gleneagles, any LBO should be transacted so as to mini-
mize fraudulent conveyance risk. Both lenders and selling shareholders should
strive to ensure the post-LBO company could survive a challenge under state
or federal bankruptcy provisions.
Leveraged buyout experts Much and O'Dea assert that one can minimize
the risks of constructive fraudulent conveyance laws by undertaking a "two-
part capital adequacy analysis at the time of the LBO.""' First, she should
determine whether there will be a positive net worth after the LBO transac-
tion, i.e. a determination of solvency. Much and O'Dea suggest three types of
asset valuation. In the first, assets are valued at fair market value 10 (which
ideally would be the price paid for the selling shareholders stock). In the sec-
ond valuation, assets are valued at an "orderly liquidation."' 3' Finally, sol-
vency is determined based on a rapid-sale or liquidation asset values.' 32
Second, Much and O'Dea suggest that parties to a potential LBO conduct
a cash flow analysis to determine whether the post-LBO target company will
be able to meet its debt obligations as they become due.133 Cash flow analysis
focuses upon the adequacy of the firm's capitalization and whether the target
would be able to meet the debt payments and other obligations as they became
due.13 4
Attempts to transact a LBO in a way to avoid a later finding of insol-
vency have recently been dealt a setback. In February 1988, the American
§§ 4-5, 7A U.L.A. (1918).
126. Carlson, supra note 45, at 109.
127. Id. at 106 (citing United States v. Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. 556, 571, 574-
575 (M.D. Penn. 1983)). Professor Carlson argued that the LBO was very close to a
looting scheme "whereby the company was liquidated not for the benefit of the credi-
tors, but for the benefit of the equity owners and the secured lender." Id.
128. Tabor, 803 F.2d at 1300.
129: Much & O'Dea, LBO's and the Risks of Fraudulent Conveyance, 9 NAT'L
L.J. 36, (1986).
130. Id. at 36-37.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 37. Note that the valuation at the rapid sale value compensates for
the possibility that a court will apply the Gleneagles rapid sale asset valuation for a
solvency determination.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 38.
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Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") issued an interpretation
statement on standards for attestation engagements titled "Responding to Re-
quests for Reports on Matters Relating to Solvency. ' 135 The interpretation
precludes accountants from "providing any form of assurance, through exami-
nation, review or agreed-upon procedures engagements, that an entity: [1] Is
not insolvent thereby; [2] Does not have unreasonably small capital; [or] [3]
Has the ability to pay its debts as they mature.' a36
Although this AICPA interpretation is binding on Certified Public Ac-
countants, it probably will not have a great impact on most LBO transactions.
Indeed, one possible way around it is to have a valuation company give an
opinion on the company's solvency.' 37
CONCLUSION
As the law of fraudulent conveyances stands, companies purchased
through a leveraged buyout run the risk of being subject to fraudulent convey-
ance laws. The Gleneagles decisions present troubling problems. Nevertheless,
careful planning and documentation of the LBO should minimize risk to
arm's-length transactions that are carried out in good faith.
PRICE A. SLOAN
135. The Auditing Standards Division of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants issued this interpretation. As stated in the interpretation, "[a]n
interpretation is not as authoritative as a pronouncement of the Auditing Standards
Board, but members should be aware that they may have to justify a departure from
an interpretation if the quality of their work is questioned." AICPA, RESPONDING TO
REQUESTS FOR REPORTS ON MATTER RELATING TO INSOLVENCY, inside front cover
(1988).
136. Id. at 4. In addition, the interpretation also prohibits any assurances regard-
ing equivalent terms to solvency, e.g., "fair saleable value of assets exceeds liabilities".
id. at 5.
137. See Much & O'Dea, LBO's and the Risks of Fraudulent Conveyance, 9
NAT'L L.J. 36 (1986).
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